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1. BOHLEN ANALYZES BASIC SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

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Ambassador Bohlen believes that the Soviet press campaign emphasizing that the Geneva conference has enhanced the outlook for world peace

has aroused general relief and satisfaction among the Soviet people. As a result, he feels it would be more difficult now than in the past for the Soviet Union to return to a campaign of anti-Americanism and hostility to the outside world. Bohlen also points out that the series of high-level visits abroad planned for well into next year makes a swift reversal of the Soviet official attitude unlikely.

Bohlen believes that Soviet policy objectives, particularly in Europe, were set forth with unusual clarity at the Geneva conference. For the present the USSR is seeking to gain the acceptance of the status quo, particularly the division of Germany. Equally clear is the longer-range objective of dissolving NATO and achieving the withdrawal of American and British forces from the European continent.

Bohlen believes that the disarmament question may offer an area of agreement with the West, particularly in view of the common recognition of the need for safeguards against surprise attack.

He suggests four factors accounting for the USSR's adoption of this new attitude: the institution of committee rule in place of one-man rule, which he sees as the key factor in post-Stalin development; the final official acceptance by Soviet political leaders of the implications of modern nuclear warfare, which Stalin deliberately avoided, and which Marshal Zhukov probably had a hand in achieving; the apparent realization by the Soviet leadership that self-isolation was harmful to Soviet technical and industrial development; and the influence of Western strength and cohesion and particularly the adoption of the Paris accords. In connection with the last factor, Bohlen points out that while the USSR has not primarily yielded to pressure, it has recognized that its former policies were increasing the danger of war.

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2. COMMENT ON FRENCH AGREEMENT WITH
MOROCCANS

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[REDACTED] [REDACTED] French premier Faure can be expected to take steps immediately to implement the Moroccan agreement his cabinet accepted on 12 September. Protectorates Minister July told American officials on 10 September that a Moroccan Council of the Throne would be announced within a few days and a Moroccan government formed possibly within 10 days. July anticipates long and tedious negotiations with this government to determine Morocco's eventual relationship with France. Faure will attempt to head off the opposition when the National Assembly convenes on 4 October with a plea for patience until such negotiations result in an agreement. Faure has strained his right-wing support to a dangerous degree, and his ability to retain the premiership will depend to a large extent on an end to terrorism in Morocco and Algeria.

Former sultan Ben Youssef will be the key man in France's attempt to establish a new relationship with Morocco. Paris, however, will remain distrustful of Ben Youssef after his return to France.

American minister Holmes in Tangier warned again on 11 September that the Moroccan nationalists would not hesitate to revert to force and sabotage, since they are convinced that they have gained concessions only through the use of force. Holmes cautioned that, though nationalist leaders are believed to have counseled patience, the Moroccan "resistance" has gained such momentum that there is always the danger of wilder elements getting out hand.

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3. GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS MOVE TO EASE TENSION

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The Turkish and Greek governments are moving to calm passions aroused during and since the London talks on Cyprus.

The American consul general in Istanbul predicts an early major reshuffle of the Turkish cabinet, with the elimination of Acting Foreign Minister Zorlu, whose statements in London were particularly offensive to the Greeks, and others.

The minister of the interior has already been replaced for not having prevented

~~The anti-Greek riots of 6 and 7 September. Moreover, the militant "Cyprus-is-Turkish Society" has been banned and most of its officers arrested.~~

The Greek government, meanwhile, is taking steps to prevent any anti-Turkish demonstrations in Greece. Although Athens has canceled Greek participation in the NATO naval exercise scheduled for 22-30 September, Deputy Premier Kanelopoulos says he hopes the atmosphere will improve enough to allow Greek participation in NATO exercises next month.

Greece will probably insist on airing the Cyprus question in the UN General Assembly, but the discussion there may be more temperate than had been anticipated earlier. Some Greek leaders are even reported to be seeking a means of putting the Cyprus issue "on ice for many months to come."

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4. USSR URGES IRAN TO FOLLOW A NEUTRALIST COURSE

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Soviet ambassador Lavrentiev, during an audience with the Shah on 8 September, urged a policy of neutrality as best for Iran and said the

Soviet Union would respect such a policy. According to Prime Minister Ala, Lavrentiev protested in "strongest terms" against what he described as heavy pressure being brought on the Iranian government to join the Turkish-Iraqi pact. He stated that Iranian adherence to the pact would be a blow to world peace, prejudicial to friendly relations between the USSR and Iran, and contrary to existing Soviet-Iranian treaties. Prime Minister Ala told the American ambassador on 9 September that the Shah is "somewhat concerned" at Lavrentiev's approach.

Comment

By offering Moscow's assurance that Iran's neutrality would be respected

by the USSR, Lavrentiev is acting on Bulganin's statement at the end of the Geneva conference that the USSR was prepared to guarantee the neutrality of any country desiring such a guarantee.

This Soviet approach may encourage Iran to maintain its traditional policy of playing off the big powers against one another. It also has given the Shah another opportunity to increase his pressure for more American aid.